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Detection of Deception with fMRI: Are we there yet?
Abstract
A decade of spectacular progress in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology and
systems neuroscience research has so far yielded few changes in our daily lives. The dearth of clinical
applications of this prolific and academically promising research tool began raising the eyebrows of the
public and the research funding agencies. This may be one of the reasons for the enthusiasm and interest
paid to the growing body of literature suggesting that blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) fMRI of
the brain could be sensitive to the differences between lie and truth. The word 'differences' is critical here
since it refers to the often-ignored core concept of BOLD fMRI: it is only sensitive to differences between
two brain states. Thus, available studies report using fMRI to discriminate between lie and truth or some
other comparative state rather than to positively identify deception. This nuance is an example of the
extent to which applied neuroscience research does not lend itself to the type of over-simplification that
has plagued the interpretation of fMRI-based lie detection by the popular press and the increasingly vocal
academic critics. As an early contributor to the modest stream of data on fMRI-based lie detection, I was
asked by Dr Aldert Vrij to write a piece in favour of fMRI-based lie detection, to be contrasted with a piece
by Dr Sean Spence presenting an opposite point of view (Spence, 2008). This seemingly straightforward
task presented two hurdles: having to respond to the popular as well as scientific view of what lie
detection with fMRI is and present a wholly positive view of evolving experimental data.
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Detection of deception with fMRI:
Are we there yet?
Daniel D. Langleben*
Department of Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania and the Veterans
Administration Medical Center, Philadelphia, USA
A decade of spectacular progress in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
technology and systems neuroscience research has so far yielded few changes in our
daily lives. The dearth of clinical applications of this prolific and academically promising
research tool began raising the eyebrows of the public and the research funding
agencies. This may be one of the reasons for the enthusiasm and interest paid to the
growing body of literature suggesting that blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD)
fMRI of the brain could be sensitive to the differences between lie and truth. The word
‘differences’ is critical here since it refers to the often-ignored core concept of BOLD
fMRI: it is only sensitive to differences between two brain states. Thus, available studies
report using fMRI to discriminate between lie and truth or some other comparative
state rather than to positively identify deception. This nuance is an example of the
extent to which applied neuroscience research does not lend itself to the type of
over-simplification that has plagued the interpretation of fMRI-based lie detection by
the popular press and the increasingly vocal academic critics. As an early contributor to
the modest stream of data on fMRI-based lie detection, I was asked by Dr Aldert Vrij to
write a piece in favour of fMRI-based lie detection, to be contrasted with a piece by
Dr Sean Spence presenting an opposite point of view (Spence, 2008). This seemingly
straightforward task presented two hurdles: having to respond to the popular as well as
scientific view of what lie detection with fMRI is and present a wholly positive view of
evolving experimental data.

Deceit is ubiquitous in humans (Vrij, 2001). Recognition of deception in others carries
significant survival benefits (Rowell, Ellner, & Reeve, 2006), but is not well developed in
normal individuals (Etcoff, Ekman, Magee, & Frank, 2000). For that reason, social
interactions may be routinely discounted for possible deception (Lachmann &
Bergstrom, 2004). Reducing or eliminating the likelihood of deception could alleviate
the burden of mistrust and increase the efficiency of human interactions. Hence, every
generation has attempted to develop objective and reproducible methods to discover
the ‘truth’, using technology of the age as well as a caste of practitioners of these
* Correspondence should be addressed to Dr Daniel D. Langleben, MD, Treatment Research Center, 3900 Chestnut Street,
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methods (Eck, 1970). In the clinical setting, ‘objective truth’ is a record of past events,
reconstructed from physical evidence and human memory. Though the presence of
deception points to what the objective truth may be, detecting deception is only an
indirect path to the truth through elimination of false leads.
The last two centuries of progress in the natural sciences have provided an
alternative to torture and other ‘empirical’ aids to lie detection (Trovillo, 1939), and
ushered in the development of psychophysiological technique, commonly referred to as
the polygraph (Matte, 1996; Kleiner, 2002; Stern, 2004). The physiological component
of the polygraph tracks multiple measures of activity of the peripheral nervous system
(skin conductance, perspiration, blood pressure, and breathing patterns). The
‘psychological’ component is the form of questioning itself, which constricts the
exchange of information between examiner and examinee to a forced-choice format
more amenable to formal analysis. Example of such format is the ‘Comparison Question
Test’ (CQT; Stern, 2004). Two of the many real and imaginary failings of the polygraph
are of particular importance: the interpersonal expectancy (i.e. bias) effect of the
examiner/examinee interaction (Rosenthal, 1994) and the peripheral rather than central
nervous system source of the physiological measures of the polygraph which places a
ceiling on the accuracy potential of this technique (Stern, 2004). Nevertheless, the
polygraph remained the mainstay of forensic lie detection for almost a century.
The introduction of electroencephalography (EEG) as the new means of lie
detection (Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Rosenfeld et al., 1988) did not dislodge peripheral
physiological measures from their pre-eminent position, but it provided a glimpse of the
potential advantages of central neurophysiologic measures in assessing processes that
take place in the brain. EEG or, more precisely, event-related brain potentials (ERPs)
were combined with the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT), another common deceptiongenerating paradigm that is radically different from the CQT. The GKT is best
described as a ‘prior knowledge test’, where items of higher salience to the
participant, regardless of cause, generate larger ERP response (Farwell & Donchin, 1991;
Farwell & Smith, 2001). Thus, unless a GKT is controlled for item salience due to
causes other than deception, it may be unable to discriminate between a lie and an
item, salient for reasons other than deception. Indeed, intentionally increasing
the salience of non-lie items has been a successful countermeasure to ERP/GKT lie
detection (Rosenfeld, 2004). Though GKT is also used for psychophysiological lie
detection, the purists reserve the term ‘polygraph’ to psychophysiological record of a
CQT-type query (Lykken, 1991). We will use the term polygraph for any combination of
psychophysiological recording and a formal deception-generating paradigm.
Brain fMRI is performed by placing the head or the entire body in the bore of an MRI
scanner, built around a powerful ( £ 105 Earth’s magnetic field) electrical magnet. The
scanner generates two magnetic fields: the main, perpendicular to the plane of the
central bore, and the weaker ‘gradient’ fields, at an angle to the main. The rapid on/off
switching of the gradients causes the hydrogen nuclei in the body water to resonate and
emit radiofrequency signals that are eventually reconstructed into a three-dimensional
image that reflects the relative concentrations of the hydrogen nuclei in the tissues.
MRI’s temporal (i.e. the ability to distinguish two points in time) and spatial (i.e. the
ability to distinguish between two points in space) resolution can be tailored to the task
at hand; a combination of high spatial and low temporal resolution (i.e. sharp images
taking a long time to record) is used when brain structure is of interest, while the
opposite combination (fast but fuzzy) is used to characterize the transient changes in
blood flow and oxygenation accompanying brain’s function. A typical fMRI sequence
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has a spatial resolution of 1–3 mm and temporal resolution of 2–3 seconds. There is not a
qualitative difference between structural and functional MRI and most modern clinical
MRI scanners with main magnetic field strengths above 1.5 Tesla are capable of fMRI
(Glover, 2003).
The brain’s electrical activity is of the order of milliseconds, while the resultant
changes in the regional brain blood flow are of the order of seconds. The
(neurovascular) coupling between neuronal (electrical) activity, metabolism, and
perfusion is robust, though it could be modulated by disease or other factors
(Hamzei, Knab, Weiller, & Röther, 2003; Logothetis & Pfeuffer, 2004). When local
oxygen demand rises in response to increased electrical activity and metabolism, the
inflow of oxygenated haemoglobin causes the fMRI signal emanating from the tissues
adjacent to and supplied by a particular blood vessel to increase. This is the basis of
BOLD (blood oxygenation level-dependent) functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI), a common fMRI approach (Ogawa, Menon, Kim, & Uqurbil, 1998). Since
there are no normative BOLD fMRI signal values, BOLD fMRI studies usually rely on
the difference in brain response between the target and control stimuli. This so-called
principle of ‘cognitive subtraction’ makes the selection of appropriate baselines and
comparisons critical (Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1999). In summary, fMRI is based on
several valid physiological and methodological assumptions, which are inherently
vulnerable to the Scylla and Charybdis of translational research: design flaws
and individual variability. fMRI has the theoretical advantage over the polygraph of
measuring central rather than peripheral nervous system activity and the advantage of
spatial resolution – over the EEG. In addition, the nature of the fMRI procedure
precludes the interpersonal expectancy effects (Rosenthal, 1994) while the
automated and protocolized data processing boosts the reproducibility and objectivity
of the results (Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1999; Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2003;
Phan et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2004).
The reliability, safety, and availability of fMRI have led to attempts to utilize it for
lie detection. The body of work correlating brain activity with basic cognitive
functions such as attention, response inhibition, and cognitive conflict (Carlson,
Moses, & Hix, 1998; Konishi et al., 1999; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000)
provided the basis for the interpretation of the early fMRI deception experiments in
terms of basic cognitive operations (Langleben et al., 2002; Spence, 2004). Building
on the pioneering electrophysiological (EEG) studies of deception, this body of
research set the stage for the initial set of experiments that have demonstrated the
feasibility of discrimination between lie and truth under the conditions of forced
choice and sometimes even cued response (Langleben et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2002;
Spence et al., 2001). Subsequent work diverged into two arms, the first devoted to
further refinement of lie-detection techniques and the second to the functional
neuroanatomy and cognition of deception (Davatzikos et al., 2005; Ganis, Kosslyn,
Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2003; Kozel et al., 2004, 2005; Nunez, Casey,
Egner, Hare, & Hirsch, 2005). While the former advanced from group-average to
single-participant studies (Kozel et al., 2005; Langleben et al., 2005), the latter
demonstrated the potential contributions of memory, learning, and emotion to the
brain activity patterns of deception (Abe, Suzuki, Mori, Itoh, & Fujii, 2007; Ganis
et al., 2003; Nunez et al., 2005). Both directions converged on a model of deception
as a working memory-intensive task, mediated to a large extent by the prefrontoparietal systems dedicated to behavioural control and attention (Langleben et al.,
2004; Spence, 2004; Nunez et al., 2005).
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The critical issue en route from abstract laboratory experiments to a diagnostic test is
that of reproducibility, i.e. inter-rater reliability, which in-turn is a function of the accuracy
of the measurement technique, the robustness of the activation task, and the individual
variability. The technical fluctuations in the accuracy of BOLD fMRI are negligible
relative to the range of individual variability in brain structure and function. Replication, a
scarce commodity in academic fMRI research, is modestly encouraging in the deception
studies. For example, the GKT2 task activation pattern we reported (Langleben et al.,
2005) has been independently replicated (Gamer, Bauermann, Stoeter, & Vossel, 2007).
More importantly, the principle of increased prefronto-parietal activation during lie has
been observed in most fMRI studies of deception across experimental paradigms (Kozel
et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2005), as long as countermeasures were not present (Langleben
et al., 2005). The initial assumption that the prefronto-parietal activation is lie specific
independently of task structure has been refuted by the demonstration that most of
this activation can be shifted to the truthful responses through manipulation
of the non-specific item salience (Langleben et al., 2004, 2005). The lack of specificity
of prefronto-parietal activation to lie has theoretical and applied implications. On the
theoretical side, the model postulating that suppression of the prepotent truth is the
only basic mechanism of lie, needs to be revised. Traditionally, response inhibition has
been associated with right inferior frontal gyrus activation (Konishi et al., 1999). In our
study (Langleben et al., 2005), the brain region that has remained impervious to the
salience shifts was the left inferior frontal cortex (IFG), encompassing Brodmann
areas 45, 46, and 47. This area has been flagged in the early literature on malingering
(Ward, Oakley, Frackowiak, & Halligan, 2003) and is the premier locus of behavioural
control (Aron, 2007). Thus, deception is likely to engage executive processes other than
mere response inhibition. The limbic system has been notably absent from the current
data on deception, often by design (Langleben et al., 2002). Recent experiments began
uncovering its potential role, making it an additional candidate for inclusion in the revised
model of deception (Abe et al., 2007; Hakun, Ruparel et al., in press; Langleben, Dattilio,
& Guthei, 2006). On the applied side, reversal of the expected activation pattern by
saliency shifts did not preclude discrimination between lie and truth, because it was
based on the absolute value of the differences between lie and truth (Davatzikos et al.,
2005; Langleben et al., 2005).
The accuracy of fMRI-based lie detection is another critical translational issue
stemming in part from the fundamental problem of individual variability. The estimates
from the two available laboratory datasets, ranging between 76 and over 90%
(Davatzikos et al., 2005; Kozel et al., 2005; Langleben et al., 2005), should be considered
a strong indication for more extensive testing rather than a focus of debate on whether
the upper limits of this range is sufficient for court evidence. In practice, the accuracy
of fMRI-based lie detection is likely to vary with questionnaire-type, countermeasures,
and other, hitherto unexplored variables. Though individual variability may diminish the
value of a standard fMRI template in clinical lie detection, individual response patterns
to a standard task could be used as a within-participant control prior to every liedetection test (Hakun, Ruparel et al., in press).
The relatively high degree of reproducibility and accuracy of fMRI-based lie
detection in the laboratory has raised academic and public curiosity, commercial
activity, and political concerns (Marantz Henig, 2006; Talbot, 2007). The more fervent
critics of the new technology have been concerned that it might be effective enough
to endanger ‘cognitive freedoms’ (Boire, 2005). This line of criticism fails to make the
important distinction between mind-reading and lie-detection applications of fMRI.
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Deception is not a thought but a voluntary act (Kant, 1964; St. Augustine, 1948).
Thus, while unauthorized access to ones’ thoughts and opinions (i.e. mind-reading
(Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006)) may be obtained using fMRI tools developed
to study addiction and schizophrenia (Achim, Bertrand, Montoya, Malla, & Lepage,
2007; Lingford-Hughes, 2005), lie detection demands that there is a lie, i.e. a
conscious and voluntary response to a query (Langleben et al., 2006). Since stability
and accuracy of human memory are limited (Slotnick & Schacter, 2004), mind-reading
is a complex endeavour that remains the domain of basic research (Cox, Meyers, &
Sinha, 2004). fMRI-based prediction of behaviour, specifically, detection of intent, is
also the topic of basic research (Haynes et al., 2007) and science fiction (i.e. ‘Eternal
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind’, Focus Features Inc, 2004). Of particular relevance to
fMRI-based lie detection is the notion that progress in neuroscience may redefine the
legal definition of deception, i.e. fMRI evidence of intent may become a biological
criterion for punishable deception (Langleben et al., 2006). At the present time, lie
detection is the only fMRI application developed enough to be considered for
translation into forensic practice.
The privacy concerns about fMRI that may be justified for mind-reading are strongly
mitigated when applied to lie detection because of the conscious nature of deception
and the atheoretical ‘black box’ fMRI approach to lie–truth discrimination. Another,
often missed ‘safeguard’ against nonconsensual use is the need for the participant’s
physical cooperation in studies in which the participant needs to remain almost
completely immobile for at least 10 minutes to produce usable fMRI data. Involuntary
restraint would be counterproductive, as the stress it would induce may override the
subtle fMRI signal differences between lie and truth. Further, though involuntary fMRI
could conceivably be legal (Thompson, 2005), it would always violate the medical code
of conduct, highlighting the advantage of categorizing forensic fMRI as a medical
procedure.
Thus, in the foreseeable future, ethical and legal use of fMRI-based lie detection is
likely to be limited to cooperative volunteers, such as those seeking acquittal, or
clearance after failing a polygraph test. Different applications may require different
accuracy trade offs. For example, false positive rates not acceptable for incriminating
evidence could be sufficient to demonstrate reasonable doubt (Halber, 2007).
One human rights concern stands: the risk of abuse through invalid application or
misinterpretation of the data (Wolpe, Foster, & Langleben, 2005). This problem is part of
a more general issue of the legitimacy of using a medical device for non-medical
purpose. Non-medical use of medical equipment outside research labs would require a
new set of ethical, legal, and professional guidelines. Bringing forensic applications of
fMRI under the umbrella of comprehensive professional codes guiding physicians and
clinical psychologists may substantially reduce the risk of unethical use (Moberg &
Kniele, 2006; Rosen & Gur, 2002). Yet another, rather circular criticism posits that it is
impossible to conceive of ethically sound prospective clinical trials of fMRI-based lie
detection and equally impossible to proceed to real-life cases without such data (Nancy
Kanwisher quoted in (Halber, 2007)). This lively debate can be continued ad infinitum
as long as the critical translational data is missing.
Designing clinical trials of fMRI-based lie detection implies using unproven
technology in situations where balancing the risk/benefit ratio may be legally
(Appelbaum, 2007) and ethically challenging (Thompson, 2005) but is by no means
impossible (Hakun, Ruparel et al., in press). The results of these trials would determine
the true potential and limitations of fMRI-based lie detection and have high societal
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impact. Therefore, at least some of them should be funded through peer-reviewed
public organizations.
In conclusion, the scope of criticism of fMRI-based lie detection runs the gamut
from sound to irrational. Naturally, criticism highlights the downside, while omitting the
two important advantages: First, the strong and growing demand for objective lie
detection is not met by the existing technology. The demand is so strong that the US
government continues to use the polygraph extensively, exempting itself from its own
ban or non-government pre-employment polygraph screening (OTA, 1983). Even the
presumed inadmissibility of the polygraph in courts does not preclude it from
influencing the prosecution’s decisions to prosecute. Second, fMRI is unquestionably a
qualitative leap forward in our ability to correlate brain activity with behaviour and
cognition (Logothetis & Pfeuffer, 2004). Thus, although one cannot predict which
combination of cognitive probes and fMRI sequences will ultimately become a method
of choice in lie detection, truth verification, and/or information gathering, the prevailing
demand and technical feasibility are likely to produce a clinical fMRI-based lie detector
in the near future.
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